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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PILLSBURY MILLS, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
NEPHI PROCESSING PLANT, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
LAFE MORLEY and CALLIE MORLEY, 
his wife, 
Cross-Complainants and Respondents. 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be desig-
nated as in the lower court, namely, Pillsbury Mills, 
Inc., Respondent here, as the "Plaintiff" or as Pillsbury, 
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Appellant here, as the 
"Defendant" or as Nephi. We do not conceive that Lafe 
Morley and Callie Morley, so-called "Cross-complain-
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ants" in the court below, are parties to the proceedings 
here, but to the extent reference is made to them they 
will be referred to as "Cross-complainants", or as the 
Morleys. 
In defendant's statement in its brief as to the nature 
of the case, the following appears : 
"This is an appeal from the judgment entered 
against Nephi, the refusal of the trial court to 
vacate the judgment, and grant a trial." 
The emphasized portion of the foregoing is clearly 
erroneous, as there was and is no appeal from the judg-
ment entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant on 
February 21, 1957. The notice of appeal filed on July 
15, 1957, limits the appeal to the 
"order made on the 15th day of June, 1957 * * * 
denying defendant's motion to vacate the judg-
ment * * * filed herein on February 21, 1957." 
(R. 102) 
Thus, the judgment itself is not appealed from, 
and is not before the court, but only the question of 
whether the lower court erred on the record before it 
in entering an order denying defendant's nwtion to 
vacate the judgment. In fact the ti1ne for appeal fr01n 
the judgment as such had expired long prior to the time 
that defendant filed its motion to Yarate the judg1nent. 
Observation should also be 1nade of the fact that 
subsequent to the denial of the n1otion to Yarate the 
judgment, the defendant filed with the lower court a 
motion for "rehearing or retrial" of its previous 1notion 
to vacate, which the lower court refused to grant on 
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-----~------------------------------........... 
August 21, 1957, and from which defendant also purports 
to appeal. ( R 82 and 111.) 
Upon this phase of the matter, we submit the lower 
court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion 
for rehearing or retrial of the previous motion, and 
accordingly, no proper appeal could lie from its order 
thereon. This by reason of the fact ( 1) the court has 
no power to reopen the question of granting a motion 
for a new trial after disposing of it, Luke v. Coleman, 
38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023, and (2) the defendant having 
theretofore appealed from the original order, it had 
by such appeal vested exclusive jurisdiction of the 
cause in this court, and the lower court was without 
power or authority to further act therein. State v. 
Carter, 52 Utah 305, 173 P. 459. 
Thus the only question properly before this court 
is whether the lower court erred in denying defendant's 
motion to vacate the judgment previously entered. 
STATE1fENT OF THE CASE 
With the nature of the appeal thus identified, a 
statement of the case in simple and understandable form 
is desirable. 
In January, 1953, the ~Iorleys, being raisers of 
turkeys, entered into an agreement with plaintiff Pills-
bury Mills, for the financing of Morleys 1953 turkey 
feed requirements. To secure such financing the Mor-
leys executed a chattel mortgage upon their turkeys in 
favor of Pillsbury, which mortgage was properly filed 
of record. In November 1953, the defendant, Nephi 
Processing Plant, purchased the mortgaged turkeys 
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from the Morleys. Nephi at that time had actual notice 
of Pillsbury's mortgage, and in fact remitted to Pills-
bury Forty Three Thousand Seven Hundred T:wenty-
two and 08 j100 ( $43,722.08) Dollars of the purchase price 
to apply thereon. (Page 4 of Appellant's Brief). A 
balance of Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-nine 
and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars remained owing to Pills-
bury. The mortgage, of which Nephi had actual notice, 
provided for payment to Pillsbury of the sales proceeds 
up to the full amount of the debt. (R 2-3, Ex. A of Com-
plaint). Nephi, without ascertaining from Pillsbury 
the full amount of the debt, and without Pillsbury's con-
sent, and prior to the receipt of all of the turkeys, ad-
vanced to J\tiorley some Seven Thousand ($7,000.00) 
Dollars under the assumption that when the final pur-
chase price was determined there would remain enough 
to pay any remaining balance to Pillsbury. 
On January 14, 1954, Pillsbury, through its counsel, 
advised Nephi that the ~Iorley debt to Pillsbury was 
Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred One and 24/100 
( $46,401.24) Dollars, less Forty Three Thousand Seven 
Hundred Twenty Two and 08/100 ($43,722.08) Dollars 
paid, leaving a balance of Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Seventy Nine and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars, and re-
quested an accounting of the proceeds from the turkeys. 
(Tr. 37 Ex. A.). Nephi replied on January 20, 1954, 
advising it was willing to pay Pillsbury the balance of 
Two 'l1housand Six Hundred Seventy Nine and 16/100 
($2,679.16) Dollars, if the 1forleys authorized it so to do, 
hut as Nephi understood there were son1e disputes be-
tween Morley and Pillsbury it, Nephi, didn't want to 
make the payment without 1Iorley's approval. (Tr. 
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--------------------------·--------.............. . 
22-35 Ex. 7). No mention was made by Nephi that it 
had previously advanced against the proceeds some 
Seven Thousand ($7,000) Dollars to Morley. 
Under date of February 11, 1954, Pillsbury through 
its counsel, replied by letter to Nephi to the effect that 
under the mortgage it was entitled to receive the pro-
ceeds up to the amount of Morley's debt to it, and it 
expected Nephi, as the purchaser of the turkeys with 
notice of the mortgage, to comply with the request for 
remittance of the amount still owing. The letter further 
advised Nephi that any disputes between Morley and 
Pillsbury would be settled by the parties to the dis-
pute, that Nephi should not involve itself therein, and 
that unless Nephi remitted the proceeds as provided 
in the mortgage, Pillsbury would sue Nephi. (Ex. B). 
Nephi did not make the remittance, and on or about 
l\Iay 10, 1954, Pillsbury served its complaint on Nephi, 
pleading the mortgage, the fact that Nephi had bought 
the mortgaged turkeys, had not remitted the proceeds 
of the sale as provided in the mortgage, was withhold-
ing a portion of the proceeds, and refused to account 
to Pillsbury for the same. (R. 1, Complaint). The com-
plaint did not seek a foreclosure of the mortgage, but 
only an accounting of the proceeds as provided in the 
mortgage. The only parties thereto were Pillsbury Mills, 
as plaintiff, and Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. as defend-
ant. The complaint and summons were served upon 
_M. L. Harmon, President and General Manager of the 
defendant, Nephi Processing Plant. 
Following service of the complaint and summons, 
Mr. Harmon took the same to Dwight L. l{ing, an 
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attorney, and arranged for him to represent Nephi 
Processing Plant, Inc., the defendant. In this connection 
Mr. Harmon testified as follows: 
"Q. That is what I'm getting at. You went 
to King for the purpose of getting him to rep-
resent Nephi Processing Plant in this litigation~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So he was authorized to represent you? 
A. He was authorized to take care of it, yes. 
Q. I take it that you discussed with him at 
that time the merits of Pillsbury's clain1, did you 
not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And discussed with him the matter of the 
$2,700.00 for which Pillsbury was seeking judg-
ment~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And it was shortly following that conver-
sation you had with l\Ir. King that the answer 
was actually filed in this case, was it not f 
A. That I couldn't say. 
Q. But you expected it to be filed within the 
time permitted by law, did you not? 
A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 32-33). 
In due course Mr. I{ing, as attorney for defendant, 
filed a motion for a change of yenue from \Y eber Count~: 
to Juab County. The motion was denied. (R. 3, 5)'. 
Thereupon and in due course defendant, Nephi Proces-
sing Plant, Inc., through its attorney, l\Ir. I{ing, filed 
an answer. By such ans\Yer the defendant alleged that 
the Morley turkeys were sold, that it held son1e Two 
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Thousand Seven Hundred ($2,700.00)Dollars of the 
proceeds, and that: 
"This defendant claims no interest in said sum 
but is unable to determine to whom it belongs and 
to whom it should be paid and alleges that both 
plaintiff and Lafe Morley and Callie Morley, his 
wife, have made demands upon it for the payment 
of the funds in its possession. 
"That defendant cannot safely pay to either 
plaintiff or Lafe Morley or Callie Morley until 
it shall have been determined to whom the funds 
in defendant's hands belong." (R. 14). 
By the prayer of the answer defendant asked the 
court to determine to whom the funds belonged, and to 
make appropriate orders protecting it as against the 
conflicting claims of plaintiff and the Morleys. Defend-
ant, while pleading the conflicting claims of the Morleys, 
did not seek to interplead them. Neither did defendant 
claim that it had any interest in the money, but ex-
pressly disclaimed any interest therein. Thus, by de-
fendant's answer, the sole issue tendered the court was 
the determination of rights to the money as between 
plaintiff Pillsbury and the Morleys. While admitting 
it had the money and had no interest therein, Nephi did 
not tender the money into court, has never tendered it, 
and has at all times had the use thereof. 
Concurrently with the filing of this answer of the 
defendant, Nephi Processing Plant, the Morleys, through 
Dwight L. King, as their attorney, filed a motion to 
intervene and tendered what was denominated as Cross-
complaint against the plaintiff Pillsbury. Plaintiff re-
sisted the motion to intervene, but it was allowed and 
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the Cross-complaint filed. By the Cross-complaint the 
Morleys alleged in substance that Pillsbury had fur-
nished defective feed that reflected itself in the matur-
ing of the turkeys, and asked damages against Pills-
bury therefore. (R. 7). Plaintiff Pillsbury in due 
course answered, putting in issue the essential alle-
gations. (R. 18). 
Thus, as a consequence of this intervention there 
became in these proceedings before the lower court what 
were in truth and in fact and in law two separate and 
distinct actions. The first was strictly between Pills-
bury and Nephi with regard to the proceeds from the 
sale of the turkeys. The l\Iorleys were not parties to 
that action. The second was between the Morleys and 
Pillsbury, and involved strictly a claim for damages 
against Pillsbury for supplying defective feed. Nephi 
Processing Plant was not a party to or involved in any 
way in that action. Both Nephi Processing Plant in its 
action, and the Morleys in their action, were represented 
by the same attorney, Dwight L. King, but there is 
nothing on the face of any of the pleadings to indicate 
any conflict of interests as between Nephi and the 
Morleys, nor is there anything in the record to so indi-
cate. 
With the pleadings thus closed, the court in due 
course set the actions for trial on February 13, 1957. 
Pending arrival of the trial date negotiations for settle-
ment of the quality clailn of the l\lorleys against Pills-
bury were had, and a settlen1ent was reached. Nephi 
Processing Plant as such was not consulted in those 
negotiations, as it was not a party to that action and 
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----~---------~----------
had no interest therein. The settlement was effected, 
and by stipulation between the Morleys and Pillsbury 
the action arising out of the cross-complaint of the 
~Iorleys was dismissed (R. 26). This left only the 
original action between Pillsbury and Nephi Processing 
Plant for the proceeds· from the sale of the turkeys, 
and with respect to which Nephi had disclaimed any 
interest. The only issue therein for the lower court to 
determine, based upon Nephi's answer, was whether 
Nephi should pay these funds to Pillsbury or to the 
Morleys. 
To solve this issue the Morleys, through their at-
torney, executed a stipulation, the effect of which 
was that the Morleys disclaimed any interest in the 
moneys Nephi was holding, that the same should be paid 
by Nephi to Pillsbury, and that Pillsbury have judg-
ment therefor. (R. 25). 
Thus, upon the answer as filed by Nephi that the 
right to the funds was solely between Pillsbury and the 
~Iorleys, and the ~Iorleys' stipulation that the funds 
should go to Pillsbury, the court on February 21, 1957, 
entered judgment against Nephi and in favor of Pills-
bury for the sum claimed, namely Two Thousand Six 
Hundred Seventy Nine and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars, 
with interest. (R. 27). 
Notice of the entry of judgment was given by Pills-
bury to Nephi on February 21, 1957. (Tr. 26, Ex. 5). 
No appeal from the judgment was taken within the 
time allowed by law, or at all, but Nephi, after the time 
for appeal had elapsed, filed a Inotion to vacate the judg-
ment and set it aside. (R. 29). A rather extended 
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hearing was had thereon on April 22, 1957, and on June 
15, 1957, the court denied the motion. (R. 54). On June 
28, 1957, defendant filed a "1\Iotion for Rehearing or 
Retrial", (R. 82) and while that motion was pending, 
the defendant on July 15, 1957, filed its notice of appeal 
to this court. The filing of the appeal to this court, 
of course, deprived the lower court of further juris-
diction, and the lower court accordingly denied the then 
pending motion for rehearing. (R. 87). 
Based upon the foregoing pleadings, and the record 
made at the hearing on the motion to vacate the judg-
ment, the defendant now contends that the lo,,·er court 
erred as a matter of law in denying the motion to vacate 
the judgment. 
While this statement of facts is becoming somewhat 
extended, it is necessary in order to fully understand 
the matter that some further reference be made to the 
hearing, and the evidence adduced thereon. 
The motion to vacate the judgment, while setting 
forth many matters strictly between X ephi and the 
Morleys, and with respect to which Pillsbury was not 
and could not be concerned, did indirectly at least touch 
upon two matters with which the lower court n1ight 
properly concern itself in detennining whether Pills-
bury's judgment should be set aside. The first is that 
Mr. King was never authorized to appear for or rep-
resent the defendant Nephi, and the second is that the 
judgment was taken without preYion~ notice to Nephi. 
With respect to the eontention that "Jir. l{ing was 
never authorized to represent Nephi Processing Plant, 
we have heretofore quoted the testiluony of 1fr. Harn1on, 
10 
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President and General 1fanager of the Company, on 
cross-examination, with respect to his arranging with 
Mr. King to do that very thing. (Tr. 32-33). However, 
the further contention is made that the recitals in the 
answer to the effect that Nephi had no interest itself 
in the fund, was in effect but a stakeholder as between 
the conflicting claims of the Morleys and Nephi, is 
challenged as being erroneous, not in accordance with 
the true facts, and in effect a mistake. On this point 
reference is made to the Exhibits 7, 9 and 11 offered and 
received at the hearing, and particularly to the letter 
Exhibit 7, written by Nephi to counsel for Pillsbury 
before the answer was filed, and even before the action 
was started. In it it is stated, 
"Nephi Processing Plant notified :Mr. Lee Turner 
of Pillsbury Co., Ogden, Utah also Pillsbury Co's 
office at Los Angeles that they stand ready and 
willing to pay Pillsbury Co. for the account of 
Lafe Morley $2,679.16 as soon as we receive the 
authority from Lafe Morley to do so. 
"We do not feel that we should make a payment 
on the account of Lafe Morley until we have the 
authority from Mr. Morley in writing. 
"It is my understanding that Mr. Morley is mak-
ing some kind of a claim against the Pillsbury 
Co. We do not want to be involved in any con-
troversy between these two parties but do have 
to clear ouselves in this matter." 
The sum and substance of that letter is that Nephi 
has the funds, that they are subject to conflicting claims 
as between the Morleys and Pillsbury, and that Nephi. 
is in effect a stakeholder which does not want to become 
involved in that conflict of claims. The answer as filed 
11 
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does no more than reiterate the sum and substance of 
that letter. 
Additional evidence introduced in connection with 
the hearing further corroborates the factual accuracy 
of the answer as filed by Mr. King, that Nephi was but 
a stakeholder, and except for the conflicting claim of 
the Morleys to the funds, had no defense to Pillsbury's 
suit. 
Exhibit 11 is a letter from Mr. King, former counsel 
for Nephi, to present counsel for Nephi, introduced in 
evidence by Nephi on the motion to vacate. In it is 
the following statement: 
"In regard to your letter of ~I arch 19, 195 7, 
concerning my representation of Nephi Proces-
sing Plant, the only time that I had any duty 
as far as Nephi Processing Plant was concerned, 
was to file for them a disclaimer and I furnished 
to you heretofore a ·copy of that document which 
was filed in the Pillsbury !vfills vs. Nephi Proces-
sing Plant case. 
"* * * 
"The material contained in my answer is what 
was furnished to me by ~Ir. Harmon. He advised 
me that he had the money from the sale of the 
Morley turkeys and that Nephi Processing Plant 
had no interest in the money itself, but since 
Morley was one of his custmners, he would not 
pay to Pillsbury since 1\Iorley had a clain1 for 
deficiencies in the feed. 
"When I discussed this with hiln, he told me 
directly that he still had the n1oney and that he 
would not pay it either to 1\lorley or Pillsbury 
until they had settled their differences, so that 
12 
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the processing plant would not be held twice 
for the same money." 
"* * * 
"* * * I know that the money Pillsbury Mills 
claimed was due from Nephi Processing Plant on 
information which Harmon furnished me was 
due it. I could find no reason in any of the 
information which I had why that money should 
not be paid over by Nephi Processing Plant to 
Pills bury Mills." 
The affidavit of Mr. King, which affidavit was 
considered by the lower court in connection with the 
motion to vacate contains the following recitals: 
"That the Answer on file in the above entitled 
action for Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. was filed 
pursuant to a request by M. L. Harmon; that 
said Answer sets forth accurately the information 
furnished to affiant by M. L. Harmon and is in 
effect a disclaimer of any interest in the money 
which was the proceeds from certain turkeys sold 
by Lafe Morley and Callie Morley, his wife, in 
the fall of 1953. 
"At no time prior to the filing of the motion to 
vacate judgment entered February 18, 1957, was 
affiant ever informed of any defense that Nephi 
Processing Plant, Inc. had to the claim of Pills-
bury Mills, Inc., a corporation. That affiant has 
disecussed with M. L. Harmon and with counsel 
for Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Udell R. Jensen, 
the matter of the claim of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 
a corporation, against Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc. and has never been informed by either of 
said persons of any substantial defense that 
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. could have or had 
to the claim of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., a corporation. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"That affiant filed the Answer requested by l\1. 
L. Harmon and forwarded a copy of said Answer 
to M. L. Harmon under date of l\fay 13, 1955; 
that nothing was thereafter stated by 1\I. L. Har-
mon concerning the Answer filed and no acception 
(sic) or objection was taken of it. That said 
Answer is in effect a disclaimer on the part of 
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. of any interest in 
the proceeds from the sale of the Lafe ~Iorley 
birds in the fall of 1953." 
Still further, in an affidavit made by :Mr. Jensen, 
present counsel for Nephi, he quotes -:\Ir. King as having 
stated that on or about l\Iarch 13, 1955, he wrote the 
defendant Nephi a letter, stating in part as follows: 
"Judge Norseth finally got off his seat and ruled 
that the Pillsbury Mills case was properly brought 
in Weber County. I have, therefore, answered 
on your behalf and filed a cross complaint against 
Pillsbury Mills on behalf of Lafe l\forley and 
his wife. Enclosed herewith you ''ill find a 
copy of the answer which has been filed." 
Disregarding the reference to the trial judge, the 
important thing is that this affidavit of Mr. Jensen's 
disclosed to Judge N orseth, who had the duty of ruling 
on the motion to vacate, that ~Ir. King claimed to have 
forwarded to Nephi Processing Plant, over a year and 
a half before the trial setting, a copy of the answer he 
had filed on behalf of Nephi. 
The second point is that Nephi had no notice of 
the taking of the judg1nent, and the proceedings leading 
up to it. There is no doubt but that fr01n the tin1e ~Ir. 
King appeared in the action as attorney for Nephi (for 
which we have seen Nephi arranged), that all 1natters 
14 
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pertaining to the action as they concerned Nephi were 
handled with :Mr. King, as Nephi's attorney, and no 
attempt was made to go around him and deal with 
Nephi directly. He was the attorney of record fo·r 
Nephi, no information was ever brought to the attention 
of Pillsbury or its attorneys that he was not doing the 
job assigned to him by Nephi, and under the circum-
stances he was the only one with whom Pillsbury and 
its attorneys could properly deal. 
ARGU:M:ENT 
In defendant's introductory statement to its argu-
ment (Page 16 of defendant's brief), a statement is 
made with which we must take issue, as it goes to the 
heart of this appeal. The statement is 
"The real dispute arose between Pillsbury and 
the l\Iorleys as to whether Morleys owed Pills-
bury or Pillsbury owed Morleys on their trans-
action. Without any notice to or information 
received by Nephi, Pillsbury and Morleys settled 
their differences between themselves ; and they 
then stipulated without notice to Nephi judg-
ment be entered in favor of Pillsbury and against 
Nephi for the debt of Morleys." 
The error in the statement arises from the empha-
sized words "on their transaction", inferring that these 
proceedings involved but one transaction as between 
Pillsbury and Morley, rather than two. The first trans-
action was under the mortgage, and involved solely the 
question of the balance owing on the feed account. No 
one has disputed, including Nephi as well as the Morleys, 
that this balance was $2,679.16. The only question in-
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volved was whether Nephi was in funds, the proceeds 
of Morley's turkeys, which should be paid over to 
Pillsbury in discharge of the debt. 
The second transaction involved the quality of the 
feed sold by Pillsbury to Morleys, and whether ~Iorleys 
had been damaged thereby. Nephi was in no wise con-
cerned therein. 
The true question here is whether Pillsbury and the 
Morleys could settle this quality claim between them-
selves, and, having settled that, could agree between 
themselves that the funds in Nephi's possession be paid 
over to Pillsbury. 
The mere statement of the proposition provides the 
necessary affirmative answer. As Nephi was not in-
volved in the quality dispute, it had no concern therein 
nor with the settlement thereof. As it had pleaded in 
its answer that it had no interest in the funds represent-
ing the proceeds from the sale Qf the turkeys, and which 
but confirmed its previous letter to Pillsbury concern-
ing the funds (Ex. 7), it could not be to its detriment 
that the Morleys and Pillsbury agreed as to their dis-
position. 
Further than that, however, if it be suggested that 
Nephi was entitled to prior notice, a suggestion we 
categorically reject, it cannot be denied that Xephi did 
in fact have that notice, as everything that was done 
was consummated through the participation of ~Ir. I~ing, 
who was Nephi's attorney in the proceedings. 
With this prelin1inary statmnent we will now answer 
defendant's seven points of argun1ent seri:ati1n. 
16 
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POINT I. 
THIS IS NOT AN ACTION TO RECOVER A DEBT 
OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A RIGHT 
SECURED BY MORTGAGE 
The complaint filed herein by the plaintiff Pillsbury 
against the defendant Nephi, was not to foreclose a 
mortgage, or to enforce any right secured by mortgage. 
The complaint was for an accounting upon the sales 
proceeds of mortgaged property, and for the payment 
thereof to plaintiff. The mortgage was attached to 
the complaint as an exhibit, as it embodied the agree-
ments under which the right of Pillsbury to the possess-
ion of the proceeds arose. 
The mortgage agreement by its terms provided for 
the sale of the mortgaged turkeys by the mortgagors. 
This was done. It further provided that the proceeds 
of the sale should come to Pillsbury for application 
upon its debt. Nephi had the whole of the proceeds, 
and paid over a part of them to Pillsbury as provided 
in the mortgage agreement. It declined to pay the 
balance, albeit admitting it had possession thereof. The 
action was for the recovery of the possession of those 
funds. 
Actually, at the time the action was brought, there 
was no property upon which foreclosure could be had. 
The mortgaged property had long since been sold and 
disposed of by mutual consent of the mortgagors and 
mortgagee. All that remained was the proceeds from 
the sale, and the parties, by agreement set out in the 
mortgage instrument, had provided for the manner of 
handling the same. This action was to enforce those 
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agreed rights as against a third person admittedly in 
possession of the subject funds, and with full knowledge 
of plaintiff's right thereto under the mortgage agree-
ment. 
The statue quoted by defendant to the effect that 
there can be but one action for the recovery of any debt 
secured by mortgage has no application to a situation 
such as this where the chattels that constitute the se-
curity have been sold by mutual agreement of the 
mortgagor and mortgagee, or have been otherwise ex-
tinguished or exhausted. As stated in Security First 
National Bank v. Chapman, (Calif.) 87 P. (2) 724: 
"Where mortgaged property has been destroyed 
or sold and is no longer in existence, so far as the 
mortgagee is concerned, there is little doubt that 
a personal action may be maintained without 
going through the empty form of foreclosing the 
mortgage." 
We further submit that the point here raised by 
defendant is not one available to it even though the 
turkeys had not all been sold, as it is a defense that 
would at most be available to the n1ortgagors. 
To suggest, as defendant does in the last sentence 
of his argument under this point that the judgn1ent 
against Nephi should be vacated and the trial court di-
rected to proceed to adjudicate the a1nounts owing be-
tween the mortgagor and mortgagee is to suggest not 
only an iinpossible, but a useless proceeding. It is im-
possible, because there is no action pending between 
the mortgagor and the Inortgagee in which the sa1ne 
may be adjudicated, and never was with relationship 
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----~··------------------------........................ . 
to the balance owing the mortgagee under the mortgage 
agreement. It is useless, as the mortgagor and mort-
gagee have themselves determined this question by the 
stipulation filed in this action to the effect that the 
$2,769.16 plus interest, in defendant's possession be paid 
over to plaintiff Pillsbury. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT WAS AT ALL TIMES REPRESEN-
TED BY COUNSEL IN THE ACTION IN THE 
COURT BELOW, AND SUCH COUNSEL HAD FULL 
AUTHORITY TO PLEAD AS HE DID. 
Defendant here asserts three propositions as fol-
lows: That there was no notice from Mr. King, de-
fendant's attorney, to defendant, 
(a) That he had filed a Motion for Change of Venue, 
(b) That he had filed an answer in the name of de-
fendant, 
(c) That he had in Nephi's name pleaded that Nephi 
held $2,700.00 of proceeds from the sale of 
Morleys turkeys. 
As to (a) above, the filing of such a motion was 
but a procedural matter, which was certainly within 
general scope of an attorney's authority. Regardless 
of that, however, the motion was denied by the court' 
so no prejudice did nor could result to defendant. 
As to (b) above, defendant's President and General 
1\lanager testified that he arranged with Mr. King for 
the latter to represent defendant in this action, and ex-
pected him in due course to file an answer on its behalf 
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(Tr. 32-33). It now seems a little ridiculous for defend-
ant to claim to this court that having secured Mr. King's 
services to represent it and file an answer on its behalf, 
that there was some duty on Mr. King's part to notify 
Nephi that he had done the very thing he was employed 
to do. He was employed to file an answer, and he did 
file an answer, so no prejudice resulted whether Nephi 
was notified that he had done so, or otherwise. Further 
than that, Mr. King's affidavit that appears in the record 
(R. 41) discloses that he did in fact notify the defend-
ant, and in fact forwarded defendant a copy of the 
answer as filed. 
As to (c) above, that defendant was not specifically 
advised as to the contents of the answer, there is a 
conflict. Mr. King states by his affidavit (R. 42) that 
promptly upon its filing he forwarded a copy by mail 
to the defendant. Mr. Harmon, President of defendant, 
and Mr. Steele, its Secretary-Treasurer, disavowed that 
either of them ever saw it prior to the entry of judg-
ment. To the extent that the lower court considered that 
question material, it resolved the conflict against the 
defendant by denying the motion to vacate. 
However, we submit the question is wholly imma-
terial because the answer as filed, namely, that Nephi 
held the funds pending determination of the conflict-
ing claims thereto of Pillsbury and the ~Iorleys, is in 
accordance with the facts. 
Nephi Processing Plant, in its letter of January 20, 
1954, acknowledged that it would pay Pillsbury for the 
account of the Morleys, the sum of $~,G79.16 as and when 
the Morleys further authorized it so to do (Ex. 7). That 
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letter was written prior to the bringing of the action, 
and was in response to the letter of Mr. Olmstead, on 
behalf of Pillsbury, to Nephi, dated January 14, 1954 
(Ex. A). That letter of defendant, in the light of the 
one it responded to, is subject to no construction but 
that Nephi held a balance of proceeds from the sale 
of Morleys turkeys, that it claimed no interest therein, 
and would pay them over to Pillsbury or to the Morleys 
as their respective rights were determined. 
Further, Mr. Harmon, President of the defendant 
company, testified that at the time of the sale of the 
turkeys he knew they were subject to Pillsbury's mort-
gage, that defendant had possession of all of the proceeds 
therefrom, that Pillsbury was claiming the right to all 
of the proceeds under the provisions of the mortgage, 
and that defendant made partial remittances to Pills-
bury (Tr. 34). Knowing of the existence of the mort-
gage, he also knew that under the terms thereof either 
Pillsbury or :Morley was entitled to the balance of the 
proceeds. Under the circumstances, if there was a dis-
pute between Pillsbury and the Morleys, defendant could 
be no more than a stakeholder, which is precisely what 
Mr. King pleaded. 
In this connection we are not unmindful that Nephi 
is now claiming that Morley was indebted to it (a point 
the Morley's apparently deny (R. 43) and that if it 
were established that the sales proceeds belonged to the 
:Morleys it might have offset the same against the 
N1orley debt. That, however, has nothing to do with 
Nephi's position as a stakeholder of the funds. Those 
funds belonged either to Pillsbury or Morley, and with 
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respect to those funds as such Nephi had no interest 
in them. If in fact Morley had a right thereto superior 
to that of Pillsbury, and if at that time Morley was in-
debted to Nephi, it might be that Nephi could use the 
funds in its possession as an offset against the Morley 
debt, but that right, if it existed, would not be based 
upon any interest of Nephi in the fund, but purely upon 
a future right of offset .. 
Finally, under this point, defendant makes grave 
assertions against Mr. King, a member of this Bar, 
charging him not only with carlessness and negligence, 
but with breach of his duty to his client, and breaches 
of the canons of ethics. 
It is not our purpose here to defend l\Ir. King's 
. actions in this case, as such is not our responsibility. 
He was engaged by defendant to represent defendant; 
and whether he did a good or a bad job of it is not for 
us to say, as we were on the other side. We do feel, 
however, that we would be remiss if we did not make 
some general observations with regard to the undis-
puted facts. 
At the time defendant e1nployed ~fr. King to repre-
sent it, it knew that ~Ir. King was attorney for the 
Morleys. It knew that the ~Iorleys were adversary to 
Pillsbury insofar as the funds in Nephi's possession 
are concerned. It further believed that the l\Iorleys 
were then indebted to Nephi. Nothing in that con-
nection was in anywise concealed, and with full lmow-
ledge of all of those facts it chose ~fr. I{ing to represent 
it. In fact ~Ir. Hannon testified that he didn't think 
Nephi needed much representation (R. 32), that it was 
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primarily the l\Iorleys' concern, and that he went to 
King because l\Iorley suggested it. All of this but fur-
ther confirms that Nephi didn't have any interest in the 
controversy other than to protect itself against paying 
the money to the wrong party, and that is what it wanted 
of l\Ir. King. 
Now defendant charges that Mr. King mispleaded 
the facts, which from the record it is clear he did not 
do, and that he abandoned Nephi in its defense, which 
he didn't, as the only defense Nephi had was that it 
didn't want to pay the money to the wrong party, and 
it was fully protected in that regard at all times. 
Finally, it is suggested that the pleading was a 
nullity as it constituted a confession of judgment, which 
requires express, rather than implied authority on the 
part of defendant's attorney. 
On this subject generally the law is far from being 
as clear as counsel would have the court believe. Counsel 
quotes at Page 25 of its brief from 5 Am. Jur. Attorneys 
at Law, Sec. 101. He didn't, however, quote the first 
sentence of the section as follows: 
"It is quite generally conceded that the control 
of the attorney, as such, over the conduct of the 
cause impliedly authorizes him to bind his client 
by a confession of, or consent to, judgment, and 
by his consent to orders and judgments made in 
the progress of a cause and intended to promote 
the interests of his client." 
Be that as it may, however, it is not pertinent to 
the present situation, as what we are here concerned 
with is not a confession of judgment, but a disclaimer. 
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What Mr. King pleaded was that Nephi had no interest 
in the funds as such, which was true beyond peradventure 
of doubt, and that it wanted protection only in the 
matter of to whom it paid the funds-Pillsbury or the 
Morleys. Certainly that pleading was "intended to 
promote the interests of his client" Nephi, and was a 
factually accurate pleading of Nephi's relationship to 
the fund. What he did later in stipulating for payment 
of the fund to Pillsbury he did as attorney for the 
Morleys-a position Nephi at all times knew he held 
-and tended merely to solve the problem Nephi wanted 
solved, namely, who, as between Pillsbury and the 
Morleys, should be paid by Nephi. 
POINT III. 
THE ANSWER FILED BY DEFENDANT WAS A 
VALID AND EFFECTIVE PLEADIXG. 
Under Point III defendant makes the astonishing 
assertion that because of conflicting interests between 
the defendant and cross-complainants the defendant's 
answer is of no effect. While it 1nay be true that an 
attorney may be subject to criticism for representing 
conflicting interests, it is a novel suggestion that a 
pleading filed by him under those circrnnstances is "ith-
out effect in an action brought by a third party. 
Here the action was brought by Pillsbury against 
Nephi. Nephi, being fully advised of !Iorleys' interest 
in the outcome of the action, nevertheless voluntaril~-, 
intentionally and deliberately elected to be represented 
by one it knew to be attorney for the ..Jiorleys in other 
matters. Morleys were not parties to this action, but 
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the 1\forleys were nevertheless the ones Nephi wanted to 
protect. This is the explanation that is given as to why 
it went to the 1\Iorleys' attorney. 
Morleys then brought an action against Pillsbury, 
which action is wholly separate and distinct from the 
one Pillsbury brought against Nephi. It might have been 
brought in a separate proceeding, but with the consent 
of the court it was brought in the pending action by 
way of intervention. Nephi was not a party to the 
second action, nor did it have any interest in its outcome. 
How it can sincerely be urged that because of King's 
bringing that action and prosecuting it to settlement 
there developed such a conflict of interests as to negate 
his representation of Nephi in the action brought by 
Pillsbury, is something we just can't understand. Nephi 
wanted :Morley to intervene, and wanted King to repre-
sent the JHorleys in that intervention. Mr. Harmon 
testified (Tr. 32) in response to a question with regard 
to the filing of the answer, 
"A. 1\lr. King wquld file that on behalf of the 
Nephi Processing Plant and the Morleys." 
If there was in fact a conflict of interests between Nephi 
and the Morleys, and the record thoroughly demon-
strates the contrary, it arose subsequent to the filing 
of Nephi's answer and the intervention of the lVIorleys, 
and was something of which Mr. King was not informed 
-as 1\lr. Harmon testified (Tr. 26) there was no further 
contact with l\Ir. King after his original employment. 
Certainly it could not give rise under any circumstances 
to a preinise for invalidating Pillsbury's judgment. 
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We submit that defendant's third point of argument 
is without any merit whatever. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE OF ALL PROCEED-
INGS, WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND 
HAD ITS DAY IN COURT. 
Defendant here asserts that Morleys' ~lotion to 
Intervene was not served upon it, that Morleys' Cross-
complaint was not served upon defendant, Pillsbury's 
answer to the cross-complaint was not served upon the 
defendant, notice of the trial setting 'vas not served 
upon it, the stipulation for judgment was not served 
upon it, and the stipulation for dismissal of 1\Iorleys' 
cross-complaint was not served upon it. All this is 
claimed to be in violation of Rule 5 (a), e.C.P., which 
provides in substance that the service of all pleadings, 
motions, etc., shall be upon each party affected thereby. 
While quoting in its brief the substance of Rule 5 
(a), defendant omits to refer to Rule 5 (b) which pro-
vides in part : 
"Whenever under these rules serYice is required 
to be made upon a party represented by an at-
torney, the service shall be n1ade upon the 
attorney • • • ." 
In considering this phase of the nmtter it is to be 
remembered that Nephi, the defendant, and :Jiorley, the 
cross-complainant against plaintiff, had the smne at-
torney, and it was deliberately arranged by ~Ir. Harn10n, 
President of the defendant cOinpany, that the defendant 
be represented by one whmn he knew to be ~Iorleys' 
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attorney. With this in n1ind we will review the record 
on the matters referred to by defendant. 
(1) The motion of the Morleys to intervene. This 
motion was served upon l\{r. Olmstead, Attorney for 
Pillsbury, but not otherwise. Defendant as such was 
not served. The motion to intervene by its terms re-
flects its sole purpose as being the filing of a cross-
complaint against the plaintiff alone. The rights of 
the defendant would not be affected by the granting 
or denial of the motion, and we submit that service upon 
defendant was not required under Rule 5 (b). Further 
than that, defendant had the same attorney as the 
Morleys, and under Rule 5 (b) where a party is repre-
sented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the 
attorney, not the party. 
Certainly an attorney who represents two parties 
in a pending action, and who files a motion on behalf 
of one, need not serve himself as attorney for the other. 
The purpose of the service requirements is to keep the 
attorneys for the parties fully informed, and where an 
attorney himself files a pleading he need not serv~ 
himself in order to have notice thereof. 
(2) The Cross-complaint. What we have said under 
(1) above, applies with equal force here. The cross-
complaint was against plaintiff alone. Defendant was 
not a party thereto, and not affected thereby. The at-
torney for the defendant was the same as the attorney 
for the cross-complainants, and Rule 5 does not require 
that under those circumstances an attorney serve him-
self. 
( 3) Pillsbury's answer to the cross-complaint. Pills-
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bury's answer to the cross-complaint was served upon 
the cross-complainants through their attorney. Defend-
ant was not a party thereto, and not affected thereby. 
To the extent, if any, to which defendant was entitled 
to notice, which we deny, notice to Mr. King, upon whom 
a copy of the answer was served, was notice to defendant, 
his client. 
( 4) Notice of the trial setting. Notice of the trial 
setting was given to all parties, through their respective 
attorneys, which is in compliance with the rules. How-
ever, in view of the manner in which the matter was 
ultimately disposed of, the matter of such notice is purely 
academic. 
( 5) The stipulation for judgment. This stipulation 
was prepared by Mr. King, and signed by him as at-
torney for cross-complainants. He was also attorney 
for defendant, and so had notice in such capacity of what 
he was doing in his capacity as attorney for the ~Iorleys. 
Whether he should have discussed the matter further 
with the defendant we express no opinion, as that is 
not involved in the point under discussion, namely, the 
matter of notice under Rule 5. \Ye do say that any 
such discussion would be of no consequence, as defend-
ant had pleaded and so represented to the court and to 
plaintiff that it had no interest in the funds which were 
the subject of the stipulation, and wanted only to pay 
them over to the party, Pillsbury or J.\!Iorleys, entitled 
thereto. The stipulation agreeing for payn1ent to Pills-
bury served only to solve the quandry defendant felt 
itself in. 
(6) The stipulation for dismissal of the cross-com-
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plaint. As we have previously noted, the cross-complaint 
was solely between the 1Iorleys and plaintiff. The 
Morleys brought it, and with the consent of the plaintiff 
could dismiss it. Defendant was not a party thereto, 
and its consent to dismissal was not required. If it was 
entitled to notice, which we deny as it was not affected 
thereby, it had such notice by reason of the fact that 
the attorney that represented it was a signatory thereto. 
We submit that there is no merit to any contention 
based upon lack of notice under Rule 5. 
POINT V. 
THIS IS NOT A PROPER CASE FOR RELIEF BY 
WAY OF VACATING THE JUDG~IENT UNDER 
RULE 60 (b) 
It is uncontroverted in this record that in the fall 
of 1953 when the Morleys brought their turkeys to 
Nephi Processing Plant for processing and sale that 
Nephi knew they were subject to rnortgage to Pillsbury, 
and that in fact Nephi did remit to Pillsbury by two 
checks (Tr. 17) in excess of $43,000.00, (Tr. 30), which 
but for $2,679.16 covered the Morleys obligation to Pills-
bury. However, Nephi claims that when the toms were 
to come in, which were the last of Morleys' birds, 
Morleys represented to it that there would be enough 
toms to finish paying Pillsbury, with some $7,000.00 
over. Based upon this representation, and without 
checking with Pillsbury as to the amount of its debt, 
and without checking to determine how many toms were 
actually left, Nephi advanced to 11orley $7,000.00 against 
what it anticipated to be surplus. This was done while 
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fully cognizant of the fact that if there were not in fact 
sufficient proceeds to liquidate the Pillsbury debt, in 
the light of the $7,000.00 advance to Morleys, Nephi 
would have to nevertheless account to Pillsbury for the 
balance of the debt (Tr. 19, 41). Later it developed 
that there were insufficient birds to pay the $2,679.16 
balance owing Pillsbury, and to offset the $7,000.00 ad-
vance to Morleys, by some $3,887.25, so on February 1, 
1954, Nephi took the Morleys' note for $6,012.58, repre-
senting the $3,887.25 excess advance above referred to, 
and $2,135.33, that they had owed Nephi from the year 
previous (Tr. 9, 10, 12). 
Morley's note for $6,012.58, dated February 1, 1954, 
was not by its terms due until December 31, 1954, so 
even if the funds in Nephi's possession belonged to 
Morley, which they couldn't in the light of the mortgage 
agreement, they were not then subject to set off against 
the Morley note, because the note wasn't due. Hence, 
there is small wonder that Nephi wrote to :Mr. Olmstead 
(Ex. 7) advising that it was "ready and willing to pay 
to Pillsbury for the account of Lafe ~Iorley $2,679.16 
as soon as we receive the authority frmn Lafe Morley 
so to do", or that Mr. King, when the transaction was 
explained to him, pleaded in behalf of Nephi that Nephi 
had no interest in the funds, but wanted only directions 
as to whether to pay them to Pillsbury or to the 1\Iorleys. 
Now defendant claims surprise and excusable neg-
lect in that Mr. King pleaded these facts on its behalf, 
and claims the lower court connnitted reversable error 
in not vacating the judgn1ent and pern1itting it to file 
an amended answer which, on the face of the record, is 
patently sham and frivolous. 
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----·----------------------------........................ .. 
The sum and substance of the tendered amended 
answer, and which defendant now contends contains 
its "n1eritorious defense", is that the Morleys, by their 
quality claim against Pillsbury, had the right to offset, 
the same against the balance owing Pillsbury on the 
feed account under the mortgage; that having settled the 
quality claim without taking into account the mortgage 
balance, this mortgage balance is nevertheless wiped 
out and defendant, who is not a party to any of those 
matters, is thereby discharged insofar as plaintiff is 
concerned with respect to the proceeds from the sale 
of the Morley turkeys. 
In other words, and to get the meat of the matter, 
the proposition is that Pillsbury and the Morleys, who 
were the only persons involved, had no right to settle 
Morleys' claim against Pillsbury for asserted damages 
~~~ arising out of the quality of feed sold by Pillsbury to 
the Morleys, without taking into account in the settle-
ment the balance owing by the J\Iorleys for the feed. 
There can be no merit in such contention. Pillsbury and 
the Morleys were dealing at arms length, and they had 
the right and were free to compromise their differences 
as they mutually agreed. If they wanted to settle them 
piecemeal, they were free so to do. If they wanted to 
settle the quality claim and get that behind them, before 
concluding the matter of the feed account, there was 
nothing to prevent them doing so. The quality claim 
was initiated by the J\Iorleys by way of intervention and 
it could be disposed of by voluntary dismissal. Defend-
ant was not a party to it, and certainly can't complain 
that the Morleys who originally filed it, subsequently 
elected to dismiss it. 
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By the same token, defendant having not only 
pleaded, but acknowledged in its testimony, that it 
possessed funds from the mortgaged turkeys over and 
beyond those remitted to Pillsbury, and having ack-
nowledged that but for its own carelessness and neglect 
it would not have over advanced to the Morleys against 
anticipated surplus funds, and having acknowledged 
that it knew when it made the advance to the 1Iorleys 
that the advance was against mortgaged birds and that 
if it over advanced it must nevertheless account to Pills-
bury, and having acknowledged that it now holds Morleys 
note for the full amount of what Morley owes it, and 
still withholds from Pillsbury proceeds from the sale 
of the mortgaged turkeys, it is difficult to conceive of 
any meritorious defense to Pillsbury's claim against it, 
much less the one set forth in the proposed amended 
answer. 
Finally, we come to a consideration of the true 
significance of Rule 60 (b), under which the defendant 
seeks to invoke the aid of the court. At page 36 of 
defendant's brief is a partial quotation from this Court's 
decision in the case of Chrysler z:. Chrysler, 5 Utah (2) 
415, 303 P. ( 2) 995. We quote further therefrom: 
"It will be found, howen~r. that these cases are 
predicated upon the hypothesis that there has 
been some mistake or excusable neglect on the 
part of the movant frmn which, in justice and 
equity, he should be relieYed. The pertinent in-
quiry here is whether plaintiff 1net that require-
ment." 
As heretofore pointed out, the sole question on this 
appeal is whether the lower court erred in denying 
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defendant's motion to vacate the judgment previously 
entered, a motion invoking the sound discretion of the 
trial court in the light of the facts as they were then 
made to appear. Rule 60 (b) in its provisions for relief 
from a judg1nent, is not dissimilar to former Section 
104-14-4, so far as the latter dealt with this subject. The 
position of this court in the matter of review of the 
trial court's ruling on such a motion has been stated on 
several occasions. In Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284, 31 
P. 446, the rule was thus stated: 
"The statute is very broad, and under it the 
granting or refusing of an application to set 
aside a judgment taken by default or rendered 
upon a hearing in the absence of one of the 
parties, through 'his mistake' inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect,' is, by the express 
terms of the statute, vested in the court, and its 
action will not be disturbed on appeal, unless 
an abuse of discretion is shown." 
And in .Jfc Whirter vs. Donaldson, et al., 36 Utah 293, 
104 P. 731: 
"The general rule is that a motion to vacate a 
judgment entered by default on the ground of 
excusable neglect and permit the party against 
whom it is entered to plead to the merits is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the court, and, 
unless it is made to appear that such discretion 
has been abused, the ruling of the court in vacat-
ing or refusing to vacate the judgment will not 
be disturbed on appeal." 
Further in the Me Whirter case, supra, the court said: 
"In order for a party to bring a case within the 
provisions of Section 3005, Comp. Laws 1907, he 
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must show that he has used due diligence to 
prepare and present his defense, and that he 
was either prevented from doing so because of 
some accident, misfortune, or circumstance over 
which he has no control; or that he has been 
misled or lulled into inaction by some agreement 
or act of the opposite party or his counsel upon 
which he had a right to rely. This appellant has 
wholly failed to do." 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the determin-
ation of the lower court in a matter such as this is con-
trolled by certain considerations, namely, (1) there must 
be some mistake or excusable neglect on the part of 
the movant from which he ought to be relieved, ( 2) he 
has used due diligence to present his defense, ( 3) he 
has been prevented from so doing because of some 
accident, misfortune or circumstance over which he has 
no control, or has been misled or lulled into inaction by 
some act of the opposite party or counsel upon which 
he had a right to rely, and, ( 4) granting the motion 
would be in furtherance of justice. The action of the 
lower court in granting or denying such a motion will 
not be disturbed by this court unless there has been a 
"manifest abuse of discretion." 
With these rules in mind, consideration may be 
given to the ruling of the lower court on the record 
before it. 
( 1) No mistake or excusable neglect on the part of 
the defendant was shown. The "1nistake and neglect" 
attempted to be relied upon is that defendant pleaded 
in its answer that it had the funds, had no interest 
therein, and wanted protection only in the matter of 
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to whom to make payment. That pleading was not a 
mistake, but on the record reflects the true facts. While 
defendant may urge that it was a mistake for its at-
torney to plead the truth, such of course, is not th'e 
type of mistake to which the rule has reference. 
(2) Upon the matter of diligence, the record shows, 
and it is a record that was largely made by the defend-
ant, that upon being served with summons, it took the 
same to Attorney King and arranged that he represent 
it (Tr. 32-33); it advised 1\Ir. King that it had the 
$2,679.16 proceeds from the turkeys, had no interest 
therein, and wanted only to pay it to the party, Pills-
bury or Morley, properly entitled thereto, (Exhibits 9 
and 11 and Affidavit of Mr. King. R. 41). These are 
the facts, and the only facts, that were disclosed by 
defendant to its attorney, notwithstanding defendant 
received a copy of the answer as filed. 
(3) No contention has ever been made that defend-
ant has been misled or lulled into inaction by plaintiff, 
who was and is the only other party to the proceeding. 
Plaintiff not only warned defendant of its intention to 
bring suit, but also warned defendant against injecting 
itself into any disputes between plaintiff and the Mor-
leys, and particularly advised defendant that any such 
disputes would be "settled by the parties themselves 
directly." (Exhibit B). 
(4) Nor could the vacation of the judgment be in 
"furtherance of justice", but on the contrary justice 
is served only by preserving the judgment as entered. 
The funds in Nephi's possession came from the sale of 
Morleys' turkeys, and belonged either to the 1\Iorleys, 
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the owners, or to Pillsbury, the mortgagee thereof. N e-
phi, nor any one else had any right thereto. :Morleys 
and Pillsbury, the only ones concerned, agreed that 
they should go to Pillsbury. Justice certainly would 
not be served by re-litigating a question upon which 
the only interested parties have agreed. 
POINT VI. 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE VACATED 
FOR ANY ALLEGED ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OR 
FAILURE TO DISPOSE OF :MATERIAL ISSrES. 
The point here is made, among others, that Rules 
12 (d) and 56 (c) were not complied with. Rule 12 (d) 
concerns itself with the procedure for disposing of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Rule 56 (c) 
with motions for summary judgment. K either are here 
pertinent, as neither type of question \Yas here involved. 
Here the pleadings reflected a claim by plaintiff 
against the defendant for certain funds, the disclaimer 
by the defendant of any interest therein, and the assert-
ion by the defendant that there \Yas involved conflict-
ing rights to the funds as between plaintiff and the 
Morleys. Hence, on the pleadings, the only n1aterial 
issue was whether defendant should pay the funds 
over to Pillsbury or to the ~Iorleys. The trial court 
was saved the burden of determining that by the stipu-
lation of the Morleys that they be paid to plaintiff. 
Had defendant theretofore tendered the uwney into 
court, an appropriate order could have been 1nade for 
payment over to plaintiff. As defendant had not n1ade 
such tender, however, and still had possession of the 
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funds, the only appropriate order that could have been 
made was that which the Court did make, namely, judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff against defendant. 
The other point here made is that the lower court 
failed to make findings of fact. There appear to be a 
number of complete answers to this contention. 
Rule 52 (b) provides that except in actions for 
divorce, findings are waived by a failure to appear at 
the time of trial, and the defendant here did not so 
appear, albeit it had notice through its attorney of all 
proceedings. 
Another answer lies in the fact that there were no 
unresolved issues of fact upon which the court might 
make findings, and findings are required only with re-
spect to material issues. The material issues raised by 
plaintiff's complaint were all admitted by defendant in 
its answer, and the only issue raised by defendant was 
to whom, as between plaintiff and the Morleys, it should 
pay the money. This was settled by the stipulation of 
the Morleys that it should go to plaintiff. 
This court in the case of I. X. L. Stores v. Moon, 49 
Utah 262, 162 P. 622, stated the rule as follows: 
"The contention that the court erred in failing to 
make a finding upon defendant's vlea of payment 
is not tenable. While it is true that findings 
should be made upon all material issues, yet in 
a case where the facts are stipulated, and it is 
clear that upon those facts the plaintiff cannot 
recover upon other grounds than that of payment, 
such a finding is immaterial." 
The contention that the lower court failed to dispose 
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of material issues as between plaintiff and defendant is 
likewise without merit. The only issues between these 
parties were ( 1), did defendant have possession of 
proceeds from the mortgaged turkeys, and (2), if so, 
should it pay them over to plaintiff or to Morley. The 
first was resolved by the admission of defendant in its 
answer that it did hold such proceeds, and the second 
was resolved by agreement between plaintiff and the 
Morleys. There were no material issues undisposed of. 
POINT VII. 
NEITHER PLAINTIFF'S JUDGl\IENT OF FEB-
RUARY 18, 1957, NOR THE ORDER DIS~IISSING 
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT SHOULD BE VACATED. 
Defendant's argument here is extremely difficult 
to follow or to understand. The statement is made at 
the outset that "unless relief was granted to defendant 
against the Morleys herein its claim against the ~Iorleys 
would probably be res adjudicata and defendant have no 
relief". 
The judgment under attack is a judgn1ent in favor 
of Pillsbury and against Nephi Processing Plant. The 
Morleys are not parties to the judgment, and were not 
parties to the action. Vacating this judg1nent is not 
going to give defendant any relief against the :Jiorleys, 
as they have no interest in the action, and by their 
stipulation, no interest in the subject thereof. 
The defendant by its own testin10ny holds the prmn-
issory note of the Morleys, which evidences the debt 
owed by the Morleys to the defendant, and whether 
this judgment is vacated or sustained cannot in any way, 
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either favorably or adversely, affect Morleys' obligation 
to defendant under that note. What the situation may 
be as to pending litigation referred to in defendant's 
brief, between Lafe Morley, Ray Nielsen and M. L. 
Harmon, none of whom are parties hereto, and with 
respect to which litigation we are wholly uninformed, 
is not apparent, but whatever the status of that litigation 
may be it has nothing to do with the present case. 
Defendant asserts that "in fairness defendant is 
entitled to file a proper claim herein against the Morleys 
and to be heard thereon". This Pillsbury has never 
denied, nor in anywise sought to influence. We suppose 
that after the Morleys intervened that the defendant 
might, had it elected so to do, have cross-complained 
against the l\Iorleys on the note, or on any other claim 
it might have had, but it didn't do so, and vacating the 
Pillsbury judmgent will not reinstate any such right as 
the Morleys are not now involved in this action. 
Certainly if Nephi holds a bonafide note of the 
Morleys it may bring suit thereon against the Morleys 
without regard to anything involved in the present case. 
What defenses the Morleys may have we do not know, 
but certainly the fact that Pillsbury has a judgment 
against Nephi will not or cannot be one of them. 
CONCLUSION 
The single question for determination by this court 
is whether there was a manifest abuse of discretion by 
the lower court in denying defendant's motion to vacate 
the judgment. We have seen that under plaintiff's 
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mortgage it was entitled to receive the proceeds from 
the sale of the turkeys to an amount of $2,679.16 over 
that paid to it, and that defendant at all times knew of 
plaintiff's rights in this regard. Notwithstanding plain-
tiff's rights, defendant nevertheless and in complete 
disregard thereof refused to pay over to plaintiff prQ-; 
ceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property. Nothing 
can change the fact that as between plaintiff and de-
fendant the defendant was at all times legally liable 
to account to the plaintiff for that $2,679.16, and justice 
would not be furthered by further litigation of these 
issues between these parties. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLl\ISTEAD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2324 Adams Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
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